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Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis:  
Causes, Fiscal Adjustment Programs  
and Lessons for Croatia
Abstract
This paper investigates the factors that have led to the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis in order to derive policy lessons for Croatia and other highly indebted 
countries. In the first years after euro adoption, it seemed that membership in 
the monetary union facilitated a catching-up process for Greece, given that 
it enjoyed high growth rates and a rapid convergence of per capita income. 
However, the global crisis has revealed that the previous economic expansion 
was an unsustainable process based on excessive inflow of debt-creating foreign 
capital. In this paper, it is argued that the government sector contributed the 
most to the rising vulnerability of the Greek economy. Data are presented 
showing that extensive government borrowing was the main factor behind the 
rapid accumulation of Greece's external debt, which made it highly vulnerable 
to external shocks. Besides the procyclical fiscal policy, some other factors also 
contributed to the overheating of economic activity in Greece. Hence, this paper 
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reviews the literature that deals with the compression of peripheral countries' 
sovereign bond yields after the creation of the monetary union, the doubtful 
suitability of the ECB's expansionary policy stance from the perspective of then 
booming peripheral states, and the institutional shortcomings of the EMU. 
The main motivation of this paper is to identify the key roots of the Greek 
debt crisis in order to derive lessons for policy-makers in Croatia. Since the 
beginning of the recession in 2008, Croatia has seen a significant deterioration 
in fiscal fundamentals, with high public debt becoming the main source of 
macroeconomic vulnerability. Reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio has emerged as a 
key policy challenge that needs to be addressed in order to reduce the likelihood 
of a debt crisis. 
Keywords: Greece, sovereign debt crisis, public debt, Croatia, monetary union
JEL classification: E52, E62, E65 
1  Introduction
This paper discusses the factors that contributed to the escalation of the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis following the global crisis of 2008. An irresponsible fiscal 
policy in the pre-crisis period could be identified as the key source of Greece’s 
marked vulnerability. High fiscal deficits were largely financed by capital 
inflows, so the government significantly contributed to the accumulation 
of foreign liabilities in that period. The road to the Greek debt crisis should 
also be viewed in the context of some external factors, which were outside the 
reach of domestic policy-makers. This paper therefore discusses issues such as 
the compression in sovereign yields of Greece and other peripheral member 
states prior to the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
inherent deficiencies in the EMU’s institutional set-up, as well as the doubtful 
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The main motivation of this paper is to identify the key roots of the Greek debt 
crisis in order to derive lessons for policy-makers in Croatia. After a six-year-
long recession, Croatia’s public debt has increased dramatically and currently 
represents the key source of macroeconomic vulnerability. In view of Greece’s 
unpleasant experience in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it can be 
stated that Croatia, given the high level of government debt, could face great 
difficulties should a new episode of global crisis emerge. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section analyzes the factors that led 
to the Greek sovereign debt crisis and discusses the design and the impact of the 
fiscal adjustment programs, to which Greece committed in return for financial 
assistance from the IMF and the EU. The third section documents the significant 
deterioration of fiscal indicators for Croatia since the start of the recession, while 
the fourth section contains policy advice on how to avoid a materialization of a 
debt crisis in Croatia. The last section presents the main conclusions of the paper. 
2  Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis
2.1  Roots of Greece’s Fiscal Problems
In retrospect, one can say with certainty that the membership in the EMU has not 
been a successful story for Greece. In 2001, at the time of its entry into the EMU, 
Greece reported per capita income at 76 percent of the EU-15 average (Figure 
1). During the following years, Greece experienced rapid economic growth that 
allowed it to reach 84 percent of the average EU-15 income per capita by 2008. 
However, following the escalation of the global financial crisis in late 2008, it 
was revealed that Greece’s apparent economic convergence was mainly a result 
of an unsustainable expansion of domestic demand financed by heavy external 
borrowing. Due to a deep and prolonged recession, Greece has seen a persistent 
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The macroeconomic indicators suggest that following the introduction of the 
euro, the Greek authorities did not exercise a prudent economic policy. In the 
years following euro adoption, Greece’s general government deficit amounted 
to 6.7 percent of GDP on average, which deviated considerably from the fiscal 
data for other EMU countries (Figure 2). Intensive foreign borrowing reflected 
the expansion of public expenditure and total domestic demand, which led to 
growing fiscal vulnerabilities and a deterioration of competitiveness (IMF, 2010). 
The unsustainable growth model was reflected in the emergence of pronounced 
external imbalances (Figure 3). Several authors argue that the widening of 
external imbalances in peripheral countries was primarily the result of a demand 
shock caused by abundant capital inflows from the core euro area countries 
(Gaulier and Vicard, 2012; Wyplosz, 2013). 
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Figure 2:  General Government Balance and Debt, 2001-2007, ESA 2010

























































































































































Figure 3:  Greece – Balance of Payments and the International Investment Position,  
2001-2007
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Unfavorable composition of the financial account surplus, with the dominance 
of debt-creating capital inflows, further exacerbated the vulnerability of the 
Greek economy (Figure 3). In contrast to other peripheral countries, where the 
key problem was private sector borrowing, the rapid rise in Greece’s foreign debt 
was mainly related to government borrowing in the domestic market, where 
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foreign investors accounted for a large share of total Greek debt holdings (Bank 
of Greece, 2008). 
Other factors contributed to unsustainable economic trends in Greece, which 
were not under the direct influence of the Greek authorities. First, borrowing 
costs fell substantially as part of a general process of bond yield convergence 
prior to the start of the EMU. Many authors relate the drop in borrowing costs 
for peripheral countries to the carry trade activities of euro area banks (Hale and 
Obstfeld, 2014; Buiter and Sibert, 2005). Second, the low interest rate policy 
pursued by the ECB following the launch of the EMU was not entirely suitable 
for Greece, which was undergoing a rapid economic expansion (Arghyrou, 
2006). Finally, at the time of the creation of the euro, EU policy-makers did 
not establish an appropriate coordination framework that would steer member 
states’ economic policies and prevent the occurrence of severe imbalances (Brkić 
and Šabić, 2014).
2.2  Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and International Financial 
Assistance 
Although after joining the EMU Greece experienced robust economic growth, 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio did not decline due to the rapid increase 
in nominal debt caused by high budget deficits. Consequently, at the time of 
the escalation of the global financial crisis Greece was highly vulnerable, with 
the level of government debt above 100 percent of GDP. The already high 
deficit widened substantially due to economic contraction, causing the debt-to-
GDP ratio to reach 127 percent by the end of 2009. As a result, Greece faced 
tremendous pressures in financial markets, which were quickly transmitted to 
other vulnerable member states. 
Greece virtually lost its access to financial markets in early 2010, forcing the 
Greek authorities to seek international financial assistance. In May 2010, Greece 
reached an agreement with the IMF and the EU on a financial arrangement 
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worth 110 billion euro. The consolidation program comprised increases in VAT 
and excise taxes, a reduction in spending on public sector wages and pensions, 
layoffs in the public sector and a significant reduction in capital investment and 
social security expenses (IMF, 2010). However, the fiscal adjustment program 
supported by abundant financial assistance did not prove sufficient to stabilize 
public finances (Figure 4). When it became clear that the first adjustment 
program would not be completed, the Greek authorities engaged in negotiations 
on a new financial package. This time, the IMF and the EU insisted that Greece 
should first reduce its liabilities towards the private sector in order to enhance 
the sustainability of its debt (European Commission, 2012a). Following the 
completion of the debt reduction, a financial arrangement worth 130 billion 
euro was signed, with Greece committing to further fiscal consolidation. As it 
soon became obvious that Greece would not reach its fiscal targets, in November 
2012 creditors agreed to reduce the interest burden and soften the required fiscal 
effort (European Commission, 2012b). 
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During the implementation of the second bailout program, Greece began to 
show progress in terms of fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stabilization 
(IMF, 2014). Nonetheless, political instability and weak public support for 
austerity measures reduced the likelihood of a successful completion of the 
adjustment program (IMF, 2014). In late 2014, when it became clear that the 
political party that was forcefully opposing the fiscal consolidation was set to 
win the parliamentary elections, uncertainty regarding Greece’s prospects in the 
EMU increased, and the banking system faced considerable deposit outflows 
(ECB, 2015). 
Since the agreement on the extension of the second bailout program was not 
reached in time, the second program expired in late June 2015. However, in 
August Greece made a deal with the EU on a third financial arrangement 
worth 86 billion euro (Council of the European Union, 2015). In return, the 
Greek authorities committed to achieve a considerable primary surplus over the 
medium term, carry out ambitious reforms of the pension system and of product 
and labor markets, recapitalize banks, as well as to accelerate the privatization 
process. 
2.3  Why Did the Economic Adjustment Programs in Greece Fail?
There is little doubt that Greece had to consolidate its public finances given the 
considerable fiscal imbalances and the limited ability to borrow. However, the 
pace of fiscal consolidation envisaged in the economic adjustment programs was 
inadequate due to the cyclical position of the Greek economy at the time. In 
particular, the first program provided for consolidation measures amounting to 
8 percent of GDP in the first year of its implementation, on the basis that a 
frontloaded fiscal consolidation would be necessary in order to boost investors’ 
confidence. However, the harsh fiscal consolidation generated a strong additional 




Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Causes, Fiscal Adjustment Programs and Lessons for Croatia
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 18   :   No. 1   :   June 2016   :   pp. 71-99
Table 1:  Greece – General Government Revenue and Expenditures, 2009-2011
2009 2010 2011 Cumulative change 2010-2011, in %/in % of GDP
Total general government 
expenditure 128,412 118,586 112,282 -12.6
Total general government 
revenue 92,422 93,253 91,077 -1.5
General government 
balance, in % of GDP -15.2 -11.2 -10.2 5.0
General government debt, 
in % of GDP 126.7 146.2 172.1 45.4
Nominal GDP 237,534 226,031 207,029 -12.8
Source: Eurostat.
By the end of 2011, the effects of the first program became noticeable, with 
government expenditures falling sharply compared to 2009 (Table 1). Despite 
substantial spending cuts, the general government deficit remained above 10 
percent of GDP. This was primarily the result of a significant drop in nominal 
GDP, which fell by 13 percent in the period 2010-2011.
The IMF later admitted that the failure of the first adjustment program was 
partly due to the IMF staff’s underestimation of the negative effects of the 
austerity measures on output growth (IMF, 2013). This is in line with Blanchard 
and Leigh (2013) who found that the IMF’s forecasts for European countries 
between 2010 and 2011 were implicitly based on the fiscal multiplier of 0.5, 
while the actual level of the multiplier in this period was above one. 
While staying in the EMU implies further fiscal consolidation with an uncertain 
outcome, this option seems to be more favorable for Greece than the alternative. 
Should Greece decide to leave the EMU and reintroduce the drachma, this would 
trigger severe disturbances in the Greek economy. First, the value of the national 
currency would probably fall sharply immediately after its introduction. Because 
of a probable lack of confidence in the new currency, economic agents might 
try to convert their assets to a credible foreign currency. As the foreign currency 
supply would likely be limited following the country’s exit from the monetary 
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union, an intensive currency depreciation might occur, generating inflationary 
pressures. Many countries have experienced episodes of currency crisis combined 
with high inflation rates, for instance Mexico in 1994-1995 (Krugman et al., 
1999), Indonesia in 1997-1998 (Levinsohn, Berry and Friedman, 2003) and 
Argentina in 2002 (Dominguez and Tesar, 2007). 
The banking system might also be severely affected if Greece decides to leave 
the EMU. Banks’ asset quality might deteriorate, regardless of whether loans 
would be converted into the national currency or not. If the government decided 
to convert all euro loans to the new currency in order to ease the burden for 
borrowers, the real value of these loans might depreciate in line with the currency. 
On the other hand, if loans remained denominated in euro, borrowers might 
struggle to service their debts expressed in the appreciating foreign currency, 
leading to a surge in non-performing loans. Pressures on the quality of banks’ 
assets might also stem from a potential recession and its negative effects on 
banks’ asset quality. Banks might face severe difficulties on the liability side, as 
their euro-denominated liabilities would instantly become foreign currency debt, 
leaving them with large short foreign exchange positions. In such circumstances, 
national authorities could impose a conversion of euro liabilities to the new 
national currency in order to prevent simultaneous bank failures. Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003), based on the analysis of de-dollarization attempts 
in several highly dollarized economies, find that forcible conversions can cause 
dramatic capital outflows, while they are generally ineffective in promoting the 
domestic currency as a means of savings.
Disturbances in the real economy and the financial sector after leaving the EMU 
might generate substantial fiscal costs for Greece due to negative confidence 
and income effects and potential costs of banks’ recapitalizations. A number 
of member states have experienced a negative feedback loop between public 
finances and the banking system over the past few years (Acharya, Drechsler and 
Schnabl, 2011; Mody and Sandri, 2011; Zoli, 2013). 
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3  Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities in Croatia in 
the Aftermath of Recession
3.1  Aggravation of Fiscal Imbalances 
Prior to the global crisis, Croatia enjoyed a robust economic expansion, supported 
by massive capital inflows and a favorable external environment. Although 
public spending grew rapidly, the fiscal deficit gradually declined, while the 
debt-to-GDP ratio was broadly stable at close to 40 percent of GDP (Figure 5). 
However, similar to the situation in Greece, when the crisis escalated, it soon 
became obvious that the apparent fiscal stability in the pre-crisis period was 
largely dependent on the high nominal GDP growth.




































General government debt - right-hand scale
Source: Eurostat.
In an environment of prolonged recession, Croatia has reported high fiscal 
deficits since 2009, which have led to a rapid build-up of general government 
debt (Figure 5). Mainly due to intensive government borrowing, the debt ratio 
reached 85 percent of GDP at the end of 2014, compared with only 37 percent 
of GDP in 2007. The other part of the overall increase in government debt is a 
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result of the transition to a new statistical methodology, ESA 2010, according to 
which several highly indebted state-owned companies had to be reclassified to 
the general government sector (CNB, 2014). 
3.2  Composition of the Public Debt as a Source of Vulnerability
The currency composition of the debt reveals that Croatia’s public finances are 
heavily exposed to currency risk. At the end of 2015, the external component 
accounted for 40 percent of total debt, and almost the same percentage was related 
to domestic debt indexed to foreign currency. Therefore, close to 80 percent of 
the total outstanding debt is directly exposed to exchange rate volatility. The 
sensitivity of public finances to exchange rate movements is a challenge for other 
emerging market economies as well (IMF, 2004). Many of them rely heavily on 
external borrowing in foreign currencies due to limited domestic supply of funds, 
and due to a lack of confidence of foreign investors in their national currencies. 
Intensive borrowing in foreign currency generates a currency mismatch, which 
represents a major constraint for policy-makers (Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza, 2003).
Having a large external component in the debt implies that foreign investors 
hold a significant part of the outstanding government debt instruments. This is a 
source of refinancing risk for Croatia, considering that foreign investors typically 
establish much weaker relationships with the government compared to domestic 
institutional investors (Das et al., 2010). It is worth noting the case of Japan, 
whose government enjoys low borrowing costs even though budget deficits are 
stubbornly high and the public debt has reached unprecedented levels of close to 
250 percent of GDP. Lam and Tokuoka (2011) explain this phenomenon by the 
fact that Japan’s debt securities are predominantly owned by domestic financial 
institutions that are committed to investing in government securities regardless 
of the size of fiscal imbalances.
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Unlike Japan, advanced EU member states generally experience high participation 
of foreign investors in domestic sovereign debt markets but this does not entail 
high risks for these countries due to their liquid sovereign debt markets. On 
the other hand, in emerging market countries the capital markets are generally 
relatively shallow, so a high participation of foreign investors can be a major 
source of risk (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2007). Confirmation of this can be found in 
the episode of sudden capital outflows from emerging market economies in mid-
2013, which was triggered by the Federal Reserve Board’s announcement about 
a possible monetary tightening in the US. 
The low participation of foreign investors in the Croatian financial market reduces 
the risk of destabilizing capital flows, which facilitates the implementation of a 
stable exchange rate policy (IMF, 2015a). Nevertheless, taking into account the 
large government debt and the high external financing needs, the probability 
that Croatia in some scenario could confront refinancing issues like Greece is far 
from negligible.
3.3  Indicators of External Performance 
In addition to experiencing negative trends, such as the decline in economic 
activity and employment coupled with a steep rise in public debt, Croatia has 
recently significantly reduced its external imbalances. After a long period of 
large current account deficits and a rapid build-up of external debt, Croatia has 
experienced a gradual rebalancing of the current account, and a mild improvement 
in the net international investment position (Figure 6). The improvement in the 
current account balance was at first driven by a contraction of imports caused by 
the recession, but more recently it has also been supported by dynamic export 
growth (CNB, 2015). The unwinding of external imbalances indicates that the 
period of unsustainable economic expansion based on excessive debt-creating 
capital inflows is over, which may suggest that the sensitivity of the economy to 
capital flows is now lower. Yet, as noted in this article, the vulnerability of public 
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finances has increased in the meantime, so it cannot be argued that Croatia is 
now more resilient to external shocks than it was in 2008. 
















Capital and financial account balance














Source: Croatian National Bank.
3.4  Did Croatia Benefit from Not Being Part of the EMU Prior to 
the Crisis?
If Croatia had managed to enter the EU before the crisis, this would perhaps have 
allowed it to attract more FDI into manufacturing activities and thus expand its 
export potential. The experience of countries such as Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Poland and Hungary illustrates that early EU membership facilitated integration 
into European value chains (Deutsche Bank, 2014). However, these countries 
have certain advantages relative to Croatia due to their geographical proximity 
to Germany and Austria, the main providers of foreign direct investment, and 
also due to their previously established capacities in the automotive industry 
(Radošević and Rozeik, 2005). Therefore, one can assume that even if Croatia 
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Based on this assumption, it can be argued that Croatia benefited from not being 
in the EMU prior to the crisis. There are two main arguments for this claim. 
First, by being a member of a credible monetary union, Croatia would have been 
an even more attractive destination for foreign capital, which might have resulted 
in a more intensive accumulation of imbalances. In the first half of the 2000s, 
the yields on Croatian government bonds were higher than the sovereign yields 
of the peripheral euro area countries (Figure 7). Despite the growing optimism 
of investors regarding the economic outlook and the start of the EU accession 
process (CNB, 2006), Croatia did not experience an acceleration of inflows to 
the domestic sovereign debt market. The low attractiveness of government debt 
instruments can be explained by the relative shallowness of the Croatian financial 
market and, at that time, the still incomplete openness of the capital account1. 
























Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
2015
Croatia
Sources: Bloomberg and Eurostat.
The second argument relates to the fact that Croatia, as a pre-accession candidate 
state, was able to conduct discretionary monetary and macroprudential policies 
to contain the adverse effect of excessive capital inflows. In particular, the 
1 For example, non-residents have been allowed to purchase treasury bills only since December 2006. 
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Croatian National Bank (CNB) was able to apply a wide range of monetary and 
macroprudential instruments to slow down the banks’ external borrowing that 
fuelled domestic demand (CNB, 2009). One of the main instruments used to 
contain excessive bank borrowing was the marginal reserve requirement, which 
obliged banks to deposit up to 55 percent of each additional foreign borrowing 
to a low-yield account at the CNB. In addition, the CNB required the banks 
to hold liquid foreign currency assets covering around a third of their total FX 
liabilities. In this way, the CNB raised the cost of foreign funding sources, while 
also establishing considerable foreign currency liquidity buffers. 
This later allowed the CNB to intervene in the height of the global financial crisis 
to alleviate the funding pressures in the economy. Specifically, by abolishing 
the marginal reserve requirement, relaxing the provisions on liquid FX assets 
and by adjusting the rate and the currency composition of the general reserve 
requirement, the central bank injected a substantial amount of foreign currency 
liquidity into the economy2. This mitigated the liquidity pressures faced by 
banks, while also allowing the government to borrow from domestic banks 
(Rohatinski, 2015). Meanwhile, Greece and several other member states, which 
did not have sufficient domestic reserves, had no choice but to seek international 
financial assistance3. 
4  How Can Croatia Avoid the Greek Scenario?
The most important lesson of the Greek debt crisis is that the Croatian 
government should focus on reducing the excessive debt-to-GDP ratio, which 
currently represents a major source of risk for the economy. If this problem is 
not solved in time, the sensitivity of public finances and the entire economy to 
external shocks will remain elevated, implying also a high likelihood of a future 
sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, if Croatia were to face another episode of strong 
2 Only from October 2008 to February 2009, the CNB released foreign currency liquidity buffers amounting to 3.5 
billion euro, which was equal to 7.3 percent of GDP.
3 Between 2008 and 2011, six member states requested financial assistance from the IMF and the EU: Hungary, 
Latvia, Romania, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
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capital inflows in the future, policy-makers should use all instruments provided 
by the EU’s upgraded economic governance framework to prevent an excessive 
build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. 
4.1  The Importance of Reducing the Debt-to-GDP Ratio
Over the past few years, and especially since the beginning of 2014, asset 
prices in global financial markets have significantly increased, driven by the 
unprecedented monetary easing in the advanced economies aimed at stimulating 
economic recovery. Under these conditions, the yields on fixed income assets 
have decreased considerably, including the yields on lower rated instruments 
(IMF, 2015b). Accordingly, Croatia registered a notable decline in required 
market yields (Figure 8). However, this low yield environment also has certain 
negative effects, given that it generates a belief among policy-makers that fiscal 
consolidation efforts and structural reforms are no longer necessary to stimulate 
investors’ demand and achieve low borrowing costs.
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Although the bond yields have declined in line with global trends, which 
temporarily alleviates refinancing risk, investors continue to assess Croatia 
as a more risky country compared to its peers (Figure 8). The existing gap in 
borrowing costs implies that Croatia has less credibility in the financial markets, 
which in turn makes it more vulnerable to sudden changes in global risk aversion. 
Kunovac (2013) argues that due to its weak fundamentals, Croatia is among the 
countries that are most vulnerable to external shocks. 



































In conclusion, the steep decline in Croatian bond yields is not driven by 
fundamentals, but by temporary factors that are set to abate over the medium 
term (Figure 9). The gradual normalization in the monetary policies of the 
leading central banks will probably lead to an increase in risk-free interest rates, 
which would probably result in more expensive financing for risky borrowers. 
Therefore, policy-makers in Croatia should immediately start to address existing 
fiscal vulnerabilities, if they want to avoid a considerable rise in the debt burden 
after global liquidity conditions tighten. 
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At the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, Croatia’s debt-to-GDP ratio 
was lower than the debt ratios for advanced member states, and similar to the 
levels reported by some peer countries. Currently, it is higher than the average 
values for both the old and the new member states (Figure 10). As soon as 
economic recovery gains traction, policy-makers should focus on an ambitious 
fiscal consolidation in order to put the debt-to-GDP ratio on a firm downward 
path4. On the other hand, stabilizing the debt ratio at the current high level 
would not be enough to insulate the public finances from negative shocks. In 
particular, Greece’s disastrous experience demonstrates that a country with a 
high level of debt and a strong dependence on foreign borrowing can experience 
a severe debt crisis if a strong negative shock initiates a recession and hampers the 
government’s ability to borrow.
















































































Note: Greece and Cyprus were excluded when calculating averages for EU-15 and NMS.
Source: Eurostat.
4 Mihaljek (2009) argues that Croatia’s debt-to-GDP ratio was already high at the onset of the global financial 
crisis when it stood at around 40 percent of GDP. This author points out that Croatia was not able to adopt a 
fiscal stimulus because in the environment of already high fiscal imbalances and generally weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals such policy intervention would lead to further deterioration in the investors’ sentiment.
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Despite the fact that it released part of its foreign currency liquidity reserves as 
a countercyclical response to the global crisis, the CNB still has large reserves 
that could be used in a period of stress. The problem is that the capacity of 
the commercial banks to alleviate the government’s funding problem is now 
lower than in 2008. In particular, the willingness of domestic banks to provide 
a significant amount of funding to the government could be limited due to their 
high exposure to the government after several years of substantial financing. 
Therefore, if a new shock hits the economy, the Croatian government could 
experience a debt crisis, because its access to international markets could be 
virtually lost as the required yield might reach prohibitively high levels, while 
the domestic banking system possibly would not be able to provide sufficient 
funding. 
A reduction in the excessive debt-to-GDP ratio could be achieved through a 
combination of fiscal consolidation measures and measures to stimulate economic 
recovery. It would be important to find the appropriate pace and structure of 
fiscal consolidation5. Eyraud and Weber (2013) find that if fiscal consolidation 
is pursued during a recession, it may further depress the economic activity and 
thereby contribute to the deterioration in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, 
if a large part of the consolidation effort is implemented during the recovery 
phase, when the fiscal multiplier is lower, the likelihood of success is higher. The 
Greek case supports the claim that a frontloaded consolidation can become self-
defeating if carried out in a recessionary environment. Croatia has also struggled 
to address the rapid accumulation of government debt during the six-year-long 
recession. In 2015, however, a moderate consolidation effort supported by the 
ongoing recovery of both domestic and external demand generated positive fiscal 
effects and the deficit shrank from 5.5 percent to 3.2 percent of GDP (European 
Commission, 2016).
5 Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012) find that consolidation programs based on expenditure cuts are generally 
more effective in enhancing fiscal sustainability than the ones that rely predominantly on tax increases. The main 
reason is that tax increases usually have a strong and long-lasting negative impact on business confidence and 
private investment, while expenditure cuts tend to have only minor effects on output.
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Discipline on the side of policy-makers is a key factor in ensuring that a cyclical 
improvement in fiscal revenues leads to a reduction of fiscal imbalances, rather 
than to a further rise in public expenditures. In line with Alesina, Favero and 
Giavazzi (2012), the consolidation program should mainly rely on reducing 
spending on items such as intermediate consumption and the public sector 
wage bill, which have remained high despite significant consolidation in recent 
years. In contrast, public expenditures that are deemed to have a positive effect 
on potential growth, such as education spending or capital investments, which 
have been reduced considerably in recent years, should be excluded from further 
spending cuts or even increased.
4.2  Entry into the EMU as a Strategic Policy Goal
In the previous section I argued that Croatia benefited from not being a member 
of the EMU prior to the financial crisis, primarily because as a non-euro area 
country it was able to conduct discretionary monetary and macroprudential 
policies to slow down the accumulation of imbalances. However, in the 
aftermath of the crisis the economic coordination framework in the EMU has 
been significantly upgraded, and this should reduce the likelihood of member 
states experiencing unsustainable economic expansions like that in Greece 
(Brkić and Šabić, 2014). Assuming that the Croatian authorities will pursue 
responsible fiscal and structural policies in accordance with the demands of the 
new coordination mechanisms, the cost of abandoning monetary sovereignty 
should not be too large. 
The elimination of the currency risk would be the biggest advantage of EMU 
membership. It was pointed out above that Croatia’s public finances are heavily 
exposed to currency risk. Pursuing a stable exchange rate policy in Croatia is not 
only beneficial from the perspective of public finances, but it is also an important 
instrument for protecting other economic sectors in the highly euroized 
economy. The specificity of the Croatian banking system is the high share of 
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foreign currency deposits in the total liabilities of banks, which is reflected in the 
high proportion of foreign currency loans on the asset side. Furthermore, given 
the dominance of foreign currency deposits on the liability side, exchange rate 
stability is necessary in order to minimize the possibility of a bank run6. Several 
studies show that exchange rate stability is often a policy priority in countries 
like Croatia, where domestic sectors heavily rely on foreign currency borrowing 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Hausmann, Panizza and Stein, 2001). In addition 
to safeguarding the domestic sectors against the currency risk, a stable exchange 
rate policy may serve other purposes, such as providing an anchor for price 
stability and facilitating international trade and investment (Dornbusch, 2001). 
This is especially relevant for Croatia and other emerging market economies that 
are highly economically integrated with a single currency area.
Considering the government’s high exposure to the currency risk, as well as the 
direct and indirect exposure of other economic sectors, the adoption of the euro 
seems like a legitimate strategic goal for Croatia. However, due to its dismal 
macroeconomic performance, Croatia is currently not able to meet the fiscal 
criteria for euro adoption. In order to improve Croatia’s prospects to join the 
EMU, the government should focus on reducing the fiscal vulnerabilities, as 
well as on addressing the macroeconomic imbalances that have been identified 
as most problematic for Croatia in the context of the EU’s Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (MIP). 
5  Conclusion
The analysis of macroeconomic performance of Greece provided in this paper 
suggests that the deep recession and debt crisis experienced by the country in 
recent years are mainly related to irresponsible economic policies in the pre-
crisis period. In particular, domestic sectors took advantage of affordable market 
6 Chang and Velasco (1998) note that the central banks that pursue a stable exchange rate policy face an unpleasant 
dilemma if the banking system suffers a significant outflow of foreign currency deposits. In such circumstances 
they have two options: to do nothing and thus jeopardize the solvency of the banking system, or release part of 
international reserves to banks, but risk a possible collapse of the stable exchange rate regime.
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financing in the aftermath of euro adoption, with the government sector being 
particularly active in this regard. The heavy inflow of foreign capital fuelled 
domestic demand, leading to rising fiscal vulnerabilities, a deterioration of 
competitiveness and a rapid build-up in macroeconomic imbalances.
In contrast to Greece, Croatia has managed to withstand the global financial 
crisis and subsequent prolonged recession without relying on international 
financial assistance. Among the factors that contributed to the relative resilience 
of Croatia, it is worth mentioning the central bank’s prudent countercyclical 
response to the crisis and a moderate initial level of public debt. In particular, 
by releasing part of the previously established foreign currency liquidity reserves, 
the central bank eased the liquidity problems in the banking system, which also 
allowed the government to borrow from domestic banks and thus weather the 
period of limited access to international markets. Although fiscal policy in the 
pre-crisis period in Croatia was largely procyclical, with the onset of the global 
crisis the government debt ratio was still relatively moderate, which allowed 
Croatia to withstand a period of high cyclical deficits without undermining debt 
sustainability. 
Croatia’s fiscal fundamentals have deteriorated substantially in the environment 
of a deep and prolonged recession, with the debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 85 
percent by the end of 2014. Reducing the excessive debt-to-GDP ratio should 
be a policy priority in order to address refinancing risk and thus minimize the 
likelihood of a debt crisis. Greece’s experience demonstrates that a country with a 
high level of government debt and strong dependence on foreign borrowing may 
find itself in a severe debt crisis if a strong negative shock initiates an economic 
downturn and hampers the government’s ability to borrow in international 
financial markets. 
The required debt reduction could be achieved through a combination of fiscal 
consolidation measures and measures to stimulate economic recovery. In that 
regard, it would be extremely important to find an appropriate pace and structure 
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of fiscal consolidation. The Greek case clearly shows that a strong frontloaded 
consolidation can become self-defeating if it is carried out in a recessionary 
environment. In contrast, as confirmed by a marked improvement in Croatia’s 
fiscal balance in 2015, a more moderate consolidation effort supported by a 
positive growth environment can provide the necessary improvement in public 
finances. Discipline on the side of policy-makers is the key factor to ensure that a 
cyclical improvement in fiscal revenues leads to deficit reduction, rather than to 
a further rise in public spending. 
In addition to the refinancing risk, Croatia’s public finances are also very exposed 
to the risk of currency depreciation, since more than three quarters of total debt 
are denominated in or indexed to foreign currencies. By joining the EMU, which 
will be possible only after the fiscal imbalances are properly addressed, Croatia’s 
sensitivity to currency risk would be largely eliminated. Nevertheless, Greece’s 
experience warns that membership in the monetary union also carries some risks 
for the economy, especially the risk of excessive capital inflows and the related 
overheating of the economy. In order to avoid an unsustainable expansion in the 
period following EMU entry, Croatian policy-makers should pursue a prudent 
fiscal policy and apply the available macroprudential instruments to contain the 
borrowing cycle and prevent the accumulation of harmful imbalances.
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